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Recently, there is an urgent need on how one can effectively defend against 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack to many well established web sites. 
Due to the increase of sophistication and severity of DDoS attack, the system 
administrator of a victim web site needs to quickly and accurately identify the 
potential attackers and eliminate the attack traffics. Our work is based on a 
probabilistic marking algorithm in which an attack graph can be constructed 
by a victim site. We extend the concept further such that one can quickly and 
efficiently deduce the intensity of the "local traffic" generated at each router 
in the attack graph based on the volume of received marked packets at the 
. victim site. Given the intensities of these local traffic rates, one can perform 
ranking and identify�which network domains generate the most traffic that 
consume most of the victim's resource. We provide a theoretical framework 
to determine the minimum stable time tmin, which is the minimum time to 
accurately determine the local traffic rate of every participating router in the 
attack graph. Experiments are carried out to illustrate that we can accurately 
determine the minimum stable time tmin under various threshold parameters, 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Network 
Security via Efficient IP 
Traceback 
1.1 Motivation 
One may argue that the important factors which contribute to the success of 
. the Internet are the open standard and well-known interfaces (e.g., sockets 
API) which allow many users to quickly deploy new applications and services. 
However, also because of this open architecture, it allows people to create 
viruses and network attacks to the Internet community. A prime example is the 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. DDoS attack is a pressing problem 
on' the Internet. Well established commercial sites such as Yahoo, Amazon 
and eBay were being attacked and were out of service for many hours due 
“ t o the flooding-based DDoS attack in February 2000 [ddoOO]. The attackers 
generated a large number of packets to overwhelm the bandwidth and the 
system resources of these sites. In recent years, DDoS attacks have increased 
in frequency, sophistication and severity. A recent study by the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) has indicated that the number of DDoS 
attacks has increased by 50% per year [How98]. More alarming is the fact that 
10 
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many sophisticated DDoS attack tools, such as Tribal flood network (TBN), 
TFN2K and Trinoo can be easily downloaded from the Internet so users of 
these attack tools can simply launch a large-scale site attack with a few key 
strokes. 
1.2 DDoS Attacker Traceback Problem 
The major difficulty to defend against a DDoS attack is that attackers often use 
fake, or spoofed IP addresses as their source IP addresses. Therefore, attackers ‘ 
can easily disguise themselves as some other hosts on the Internet. Because of 
the stateless nature of the Internet (e.g., core router does not store any path or 
source information), it is difficult to determine or to trace the originating source 
of these attackers' packets and thereby locating the potential locations of these 
DDoS attackers. This is known as the DDoS attacker traceback problem. 
One intrinsic characteristic of a DDoS attack is that source addresses of 
packets are usually spoofed. To avoid these spoofed packets into the Inter-
net, an ISP network administrator can implement services such as ingress 
filtering [FS98], for example, refusing packet forwarding service whenever the 
packet's source IP address is not within the ISP's administrative domain. If 
these packets are dropped, they will not be able to enter the Internet core 
and thereby reducing the possibility of a DDoS attack. However, ingress fil-
， tering required edge routers to have sufficient processing power, not only to 
inspect the packet's destination IP address for normal packet forwarding ser-
, v i c e , but also ne.ed to inspect the source IP address and determine whether 
it is a legitimate or illegitimate address. Another major problem about the 
ingress filtering approach is that this technique is only effective if there is a 
“widespread deployment" in the networking community (e.g., many ISPs are 
willing to deploy this service). Moreover, even with the enabling of ingress 
filtering service, attackers can still forge the source IP addresses as other hosts 
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which are within the edge router's local network domains. Researchers also 
proposed other method to counter the DDoS attack, for example the input 
debugging technique [StoOO], which requires cooperation between system ad-
ministrators of different ISPs. The limitation of this approach is that it may 
not be able to trace the DDoS attackers in real-time or in the midst of a DDoS 
attack (since not all administrators of all ISPs are working at the same time). 
Other approaches such as controlled flooding [BCOO], which generates many 
additional packets to the network (which can be viewed as another form of 
DDoS attack), or network logging [SPS+01], which requires additional storage 
and computational overhead of the participating routers. All in all, the above 
approaches have performance problems and significant deployment difficulties. 
Recently, a number of researchers [SWKAOO, PLOl, SPOl] proposed prob-
abilistic edge marking algorithm to traceback the locations of the attackers. 
Each participating router will probabilistically mark packets targeted to a vic-
tim site. Based on the received marked packets, the victim can construct an 
attack graph which depicts the traversed paths of all received packets to the 
victim site. This implies that the attack graph consists of the traversed paths 
of attack packets, as well as the traversed paths of regular packets. Therefore, 
one major shortcoming of this approach is that it does not identify and locate 
t"he potential attackers. In this work, we complement and enhance the proba-
bilistic marking method by identifying the locations of these attackers under 
the flooding-based DDoS attack. The contributions of our work are: 
• We propose an effective method so that the victim site can deduce the 
local traffic rates of all participating routers in the attack graph. 
• We provide a theoretical framework to determine the minimum stable 
time tmin, which is the minimum time required to accurately determine 
the local traffic rates of all participating routers. Note that the lower the 
value of tmin implies that the system administrators can determine the 
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locations of attackers earlier. 
• The traceback methodology is effective for a general network topology. 
1.3 Document Roadmap 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide the necessary 
background of the probabilistic marking algorithm. In Chapter 3, we present 
the traceback method as well as how we can eliminate potential attackers for 
a simple but illustrative linear network topology. In Chapter 4, we extend 
our traceback methodology to a general network topology. Simulations and 
experiments are presented in Chapter 5 and 6 to illustrate the effectiveness of 
our traceback methodology. Related work is presented in Chapter 7. Lastly, 
conclusion is given in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 2 
Background 
IP traceback is an approach to determine the source of an attack when a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack occurs. To accomplish this, we 
assume that routers will provide additional packet marking functions besides 
the basic packet routing/forwarding service. In particular, whenever a packet 
passes through a router, the packet will be marked, either deterministically or 
probabilistically. The marked packets are filled with the information of their 
respective traversed paths. Upon receiving these marked packets, a victim 
site, denoted by V, can use the marking information to create an attack graph. 
Based on the attack graph and the received packets, a victim site V trace the 
attackers back towards the sources (e.g., the originated router of the attack 
traffic). In the following, we first present the necessary background of the 
probabilistic edge marking algorithm [SWKAOO], which is used by a victim 
site V to create an attack graph. Given the attack graph, we then present 
the methodology to estimate the local traffic rate of each router in the attack 
graph as well as the minimum time it takes to locate the potential attackers. 
2.1 Probabilistic Edge Marking Algorithm 
To provide IP traceback feature, one can implement this service by allocating 
enough space in an IP packet header so that one can use this space to record 
14 
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the traversed path of a packet. For example, each router, besides performing 
the normal packet routing and forwarding functions, also records or appends 
its own IP at the packet's header so that when a victim site V receives a 
marked packet, it can examine the packet's header and obtain the complete 
traversed path information of the marked packet. However, the major problem 
about this simple approach is that the length of a traversed path (e.g., number 
of hops) of a packet is not fixed. For example, a packet to a victim site 
V may traverse only two hops while another packet may traverse 15 hops. 
Therefore, it is impossible to pre-allocate sufficient amount of. space in the 
packet's header in a prior fashion. Another technical difficulty of recording 
the complete traversed path information of each packet to the victim site V is 
that an attacker can potentially manipulate this path information and fill in 
with false router's identification so as to mislead the victim site V in the path 
analysis. 
2.1.1 Probabilistic Edge Marking Procedure 
• Recently, probabilistic edge marking algorithm was proposed by Savage [SWKAOO' 
and others [PLOl, SPOl]. The idea is that instead of recording the complete 
traversed path information of a packet, one only needs to record a traversed 
edge from the attacker to the victim site V in a probabilistic fashion. Under 
. the probabilistic edge marking algorithm, some unused fields in the packet's 
header are used to store three finite fields. These three fields are { s t a r t , 
end，distance}. The start and end fields store the IP addresses of the 
‘ t w o routers at ttie end points of the marked edge while the d i s tance field 
records the number of hops between the marked edge and the victim site V 
• When a victim site V is under a DDoS attack, the victim site V will send 
a "marking-request-s ignal” to a set of routers (e.g., all routers which are 
within d>l hops away from the victim site V) requesting their participations 
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for the probabilistic edge marking process. Each participating router will then 
mark each packet targeted to the victim site V with probability p. In other 
words, whenever an IP packet which is targeted to the victim site V passes 
through a router in the enabled router set, the router, upon deciding the out-
going edge of this packet through the standard routing table lookup, also marks 
this out-going edge into this packet's IP header with a probability p. In this 
case, the router records its IP address into the s tar t field and sets the value 
of the distance field to zero. If the router decides not to mark the packet, the 
router needs to check whether the distance field of the packet is.equal to zero 
or not. If it is equal to zero, the router records its IP address in the end field 
and then increments the d istance field by one. If the distance field is not 
equal to zero, the router simply increments the d is tance field by one. Note 
that the mandatory increment of the distance field is crucial because it is used 
to minimize the probability of spoofing a marked edge. Under this marking 
method, any packet generated by an attacker will have distance greater than or 
equal to the hop count between the victim site V and the attacker. Therefore, 
a single attacker cannot forge any edge between himself and the victim site V. 
The probabilistic edge marking algorithm by each participating router in the 
enabled set is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Due to the property of the probabilistic marking algorithm, each traversed 
edge of an attack packet will have a different probability of being marked or 
unmarked. Let Pm{d) denote the probability that a victim site V will find an 
edge which is d hops away as a marked edge. In general, we have 
Pm{d) = p{1-pY d>0. (2.1) 
In other words, an edge which is d hops away from the victim site V will only 
be marked if a router which is connected to that edge decides to mark the 
packet and the remaining routers along the packet's traversed path decide not 
to mark (or reset the mark) this packet. Let Pu{d) be the probability that a 
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Algorithm: Edge Marking Procedure at router R 
for (each packet w targeted to the victim site V) { 
generate a random number x between [0..1); 
if (x < p) { /* router R needs to mark the pkt*/ 
write R into w;.start and 0 into lo.distance; 
} 
else { /* router R does not need to mark */ 
if (u;.distance = = 0) { 





Figure 2.1: Probabilistic edge marking algorithm for each participating router 
victim site V will not find an edge which is d hops away or closer as a marked 
edge. We have 
Puid) = ( l l 广 d > 0 . (2.2) 
. In other words, all routers along the path to the victim site V decide not 
to mark the packet. ‘ Figure 2.2 illustrates the set of marked and unmarked 
edges collected by the victim site V under a simple linear network topology. 
In this example, the victim site V can collect four types of packets. The 
. first three types are marked packets with edges (R3, R2), (R2, Ri) and { R i , - ) 
respectively. The last type of packet received by victim site V is the unmarked 
packet. 
2.1.2 Attack Graph Construction Procedure 
A victim site V, upon receiving packets, needs to first filter out those unmarked 
packets (since they don't carry any information in the attack graph construc-
tion). For all the collected marked packets, the victim site V needs to execute 
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Figure 2.2: Example of a probabilistic edge marking 
the graph construction algorithm so as to re-construct the attack graph. We 
present the attack graph construction algorithm in Figure 2.3. 
To illustrate the attack graph construction algorithm, let us consider a 
network which has a tree-like topology depicted in Figure 2.4. In the figure, 
routers are represented by Ri and the victim site is represented by V. Packets 
passing through the routers will be marked by the probabilistic edge marking 
algorithm depicted in Figure 2.1. After some measurement period, the victim 
site V will receive packets with the following marking classification: 
Distance Packet Marking Type 
. • from V 
— un-marked packet 
0 ( ^ 1 - - , 0 ) , — _ ,0) , ( i ^ 8 - - , 0 ) 
1 (私，/?1’1), {Re. ^5,1), 
• 2 (H4, i?2,2), 尺6,2), 
(丑 10，丑9，2) 
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Algorithm: Attack Graph Construction 
Procedure at victim site V 
Initialize the tree Q to have a root node which 
is the victim site V; 
filter out unmarked packet; 
sort marked packet in ascending order of the value 
of the distance field; 
/ * attach each marked edge to the t ree Q * / 
for (each marked packet w) { 
if (it;.distance = = 0) { 
insert edge (u;.start,V,0) into Q; . 
} • 
else { 
if ((w.end = = one of the outermost node in Q) and 
(u;.distance = = that outermost node's distance)) 
insert edge (ti；.start,ly.end,!/;.distance) into 
} 
} • 
extract path (R—Rj) by enumerating acyclic paths in Q-, 
Figure 2.3: Attack graph construction algorithm 
. Victim site V uses these marked packets to create an attack graph based 
on the attack graph construction algorithm depicted in Figure 2.3. From the 
above example, the attack graph contains four linear paths, they are: 
1. Path 1: R s ^ Ri -> V, 
‘ 2. Path 2: R i ^ V, 
3. Path 3: R7 ^ Re ^ R^-^V and 
y » 
4. Path 4: Rio ^ Rg-^ Rs -^V . 
2.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Algorithm 
It is important to point out that the advantages of the probabilistic marking 
algorithm are 
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• One only needs to allocate a small and finite space at the IP packet 
header so as to store the edge information. As proposed in [SWKAOO], 
this can be achieved using the existing unused space at the IP's packet 
header. 
• The distance field provides an “ordering relationship" between edges so 
that a victim site V can construct the attack graph from the received 
marked edges. 
• One can use this algorithm to construct the attack graph in real-time 
(e.g., construction on an attack graph in the midst of a DDoS attack). 
One major shortcoming of the probabilistic edge marking algorithm [SWKAOO, 
SPOl] is that it does not provide an effective means to locate the positions of the 
potential attackers. In general, the attack graph only provides the topology of 
traffic targeted to a victim site V. In the following, we present a methodology to 
identify the potential attackers and at the same time, to quantify the minimum 
time required to determine the locations of the attackers. 
t： ‘ 
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i from the local domain of R^ to V 
Figure 2.4: Example of attack graph construction: Solid lines represent edges 
of the constructed attack graph Q while a dotted line represents an edge that 
is not marked or discovered by the algorithm. 
Chapter 3 
Attacker Traceback: Linear 
Topology 
We observe that the victim site V can utilize the marked packets in two ways. 
First, these marked packets are used to construct an attack graph Q. Secondly, 
one can also use these marked packets to generate statistical information so 
as to traceback the potential attackers. Before we proceed, let us define the 
following concept. 
‘ Definition 1 A "local traffic" of router Ri is the traffic workload generated 
within the local administrative domain of router Ri. 
To illustrate, consider a LAN using a router Ri as its gateway to the Internet, 
then all packets generated within this LAN to machines outside this LAN 
domain have to go through the router Ri and these packets are considered 
as the local traffic of Ri. In the following, we will show that based on the 
collected marked-packets, one can deduce the intensity of the local traffic for 
every router in the attack graph Q. Based on the traffic intensity of the local 
traffic rate at each router, one can determine the possible locations of the 
attackers. It is important to point out that one major technical difficulty in 
estimating the local traffic rate of a router is to determine the ‘‘minimum stable 
time" tmin, which is the minimum time we need to collect the marked packets 
22 
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so that the calculated local traffic rates are correct and stable. In the following 
two subsections, we illustrate how we can determine the local traffic rates and 
the minimum stable time tmin. 
3.1 Determination of Local Traffic Rates 
To illustrate the methodology, let us consider the following simple but illus-
trative example (in later chapter, we will extend the methodology to a general 
network topology). Figure 3.1 illustrates a linear network topology with d 
routers Ri, where I < i < d. Router Ri receives its local traffic (e.g. traf-
fic which is generated from its local network domain) to the victim site V. 
Let \i denotes the average local traffic rate, in unit of packets per second, 
from the router Ri to the victim site V. Each router also performs packet 
routing/forwarding function for all upstream traffics which are targeted to the 
victim site V. For example, router R3 in Figure 3.1 performs packet rout-
ing/forwarding for traffic Xj for j = 3 , 4 , . . . The objective is that if one 
can estimate the local traffic rate 入‘ for all these routers from the received 
marked packets, then based on the intensities of these traffic rates, one can 
identify the locations of the attackers. Also note that in estimating the local 
traffic rate A^ , one cannot simply rely on inspecting the source IP addresses 
since they can be easily spoofed by the attackers. 
^ © ^ ( ^ … … 
丄入d JL入d-l 上入3 上入2 入1 
6 6 6 6 6 
local network local network 
domain of Rd domain of Ri 
Figure 3.1: Linear topology with local traffic rate Aj to the victim site V. 
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Due to the nature of the probabilistic marking algorithm, each router may 
mark any local or upstream transit packet to the victim site V. If the router Rj 
decides to mark a transit packet, then in essence, it resets the packet's marking, 
if there is any, by any upstream routers of Rj. Let Nj{t) be the random variable 
denoting the number of marked packets received by the victim site V at time 
t such that the s tar t field is equal to router Rj, for I < j < d. To compare 
these random variables Nj(t) for 1 < j < (i, we need the following definition 
from [Ros96]. 
Definition 2 Let Xi and X2 be two random variables. We say that Xi is 
stochastically larger than X2, denote as Xi >st X飞 , i f 
Prob[Xi > x]> Prob[X2 > x] Mx. 
It is clear that if we collect marked packets for a sufficiently long period, then 
we have the following relationship: 
Nj(t) >st for j = I , . . .， ( i - L (3.1) 
The above relationship holds because 
1. Each router carries its local traffic as well as any upstream transit traffic 
^ to the victim site V. In a long run, the number of marked packets by Rj 
should be greater than the number of marked packets by Rj+i. 
2. Each router Rj will probabilistically mark a transit packet to the victim 
site V. Therefore, the router Rj erases any edge marking by an upstream 
router. • . 
Let Nj{t) be the number of marked packets received by the victim site V at 
time t such that the s tar t field is equal to router Rj. We have the following 
relationship: 
/ d \ 
Nj(t) = j = l’ ...，". (3.2) 
V t=3 / 
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The term in the parenthesis corresponds to the total number of packets tar-
geted to victim site V forwarding by router Rj at time the remaining term 
is the probability that these packets are marked by Rj and that these packets 
are not marked by any downstream routers of Rj. Equation (3.2) is a system 
of triangular equations, we can re-arrange the above equations and obtain the 
local traffic rate at each router Ri as: 
f m 风+1 � i < i < d - i • 
‘ _ 糊 H ( ) 
I 印 ( i -P广 1 z - a. 
3.2 Determination of Minimum Stable Time 
十. 
The remaining technical issue is, to have an accurate estimation of these local 
. traffic rates, we have to make sure that the conditions in Equation (3.1) are 
satisfied. It is not difficult to observe that these conditions are not satisfied, 
for example, when the duration of collecting these marked packet is very small 
(e.g. t ^ 0). In the following, we provide an analytical method to derive 
• the minimum stable time tmin such that the conditions of Equation (3.1) are 
satisfied. Once these conditions are satisfied, we can then use the estimation 
of the local traffic rates based on Equation (3.3) to traceback the potential 
attackers. 
To simplify the notation, let us define: 
/ d \ 
NAt) = where A�- = I ] A, p(l - (3.4) 
V t=j / 
Chapter 4 Attacker Traceback: General Topology 26 
Assuming that the random variables Nj and Nj+i are Poisson random vari-
ables^ , w e can re-formulate the problem of finding the minimum stable time 
tmin as. 
Froh[Nj(tmin) > Nj+i{tmin)] > Pthreshoid 
V j e { 1 , . . . , “ 1 } . (3.5) 
where pthreshoid is a large probability (e.g., pthreshoid = 95%). In other words, 
we want to find the minimum time tmin such that, with a very high probability, 
the number of collected packets marked by router Rj is higher than the number ‘ 
of collected packets marked by router Rj+i for 1 < j < d—1. Since the random 
variables Nj{t) and Nj+i{t) are Poisson random variables, we have 
P r o b [ " j ( , — ) > Nj+i(tminy = 
CO 
Y^FT0h[Nj{tmin) > k]FT0h[Nj+i{tmin) = k.= 
A ; = 0 
乙 乙 r^ ! k\ 
A;=0 Ln=:/c _ 
V j e { 1 ’ . . . ( 3 . 6 ) 
Based on the above expression, one can easily determine the minimum stable 
time tmin using some standard numerical methods [BF88]. Figure 3.2 illus-
trates the "local traffic estimation procedure" to estimate the local traffic rate 
of each router in an attack graph Q. 
3.3 Elimination of Attackers 
y » 
In the previous subsection, we have presented the methodology on how one 
can estimate the local traffic rate for each router in the attack graph Q. In 
this subsection, we present the algorithm to find the potential attackers and 
eliminate their attack traffics. 
iln later chapter, we will illustrate that even if the arrival process is non-Poisson, the 
estimate is still very robust to evaluate tmin and the intensity of the local traffic. 
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Algorithm: Local Traffic Estimation 
Procedure at victim site V: 
let 'P be a linear path to the victim site V; 
let be the set of routers along the path V; 
/ * Note that V and S-p are derived from * / 
/ * the probabilistic edge maxking algorithm.*/ 
set stable = false; 
while (stable = = false){ 
/ * has not reached tmin yet * / 
collect marked packets for some time; 
for (each router Ri in S-p) { • 
calculate the local traffic Xi of Ri based on Eq. (3.3); 
} • 
determine whether we have reached the minimum 
stable time tmin or not for each router in S-p 
based on Equation (3.6); 
if (tmin is reached) 
stable = true; 
} 
output: local traffic rate Xi for router Ri in S-p. 
Figure 3.2: Algorithm to determine local traffic rate for every router in the 
. attack graph. 
Given a linear path V in the attack graph, the victim site V can choose to 
reduce its traffic loading by a pre-determined fraction TcutoSf(V). To reduce 
the traffic, the victim site V determines the local traffic rates for all routers 
in the path V, then it sorts these traffic rates in non-increasing order. The 
victim site V then sends signal to a subset of routers along the path V and 
,instructs these routers to stop forwarding their respective local traffics to the 
victim site V. Note that a router can refuse packet forwarding by examining 
not the source IP address (which can be spoofed), but rather, by examining 
data link layer information of a packet, for example, the link address to the 
attached LAN. Figure 3.3 illustrates the procedure to eliminate the attacker's 
traffic to victim site V. 
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Algorithm: Eliminate Potential Attackers 
along path V 
Let V he a. linear path to the victim site V; 
Let S-p be the set of routers along the path V] 
Derive the local traffic rate for router Ri G Sp based 
on the "local traffic estimation procedure"； 
Sort {Ai} in non-increasing order and let the 
/ 
sorted sequence be {Aj}; 
A 
Find the “minimum” i* such that 比 / > Tcutoff{V)； 
Send control signals to routers {Rj}i<j<i* so that • 
routers can stop their local traffics to victim site V; 
Figure 3.3: Algorithm to find potential attackers and eliminate their attack 
traffics to V. 
* "N ( N f \ / \ • \ • N ^ ― 
Rio — Rg — Rs 一 … • — R3 — R2 — Ri — / V J 
V V V V V V 
入 1 0 入 9 入 8 入 3 入 2 入 1 
Attacker Attacker 
• Figure 3.4: Example to estimate the local traffic rates 
‘ T o illustrate, let us consider an example in Figure 3.4. We consider a 
linear topology with 10 routers. Routers R ” FU to Rg carry normal local 
- traffic with a rate of 10 pkts/sec to the victim site V. There are two attackers 
in the network and they are located at routers R3 and Riq. The attacker 
in Rs generates an attack traffic rate of 80 pkts/sec to V while the attacker 
in Rio generates an attack traffic rate of 100 pkts/sec to V. The marking 
probability p for the Edge Marking Algorithm is set to 0.1 and the stability 
threshold pthreshoid is set to 95%. In this example, the victim site V calculates 
the percentage of stability for every 10 seconds. Table 3.1 illustrates that after 
going through the loop of the traffic estimation procedure six times, we can 
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accurately estimate the local traffic rate at each router Ri for i = 1 , . . . , 10. 
In other words, it only takes around 60 seconds to find the potential attackers 
in R3 and Riq. Table 3.2 illustrates the percentage of the local traffic at each 
Time Stability W3 Wo Other Ri 
(sec) Traffic Traffic Average 
Traffic 
(%) (pkts/sec) (pkts/sec) (pkts/sec) 
10.0 43 99.18 92.92 7.24 “ 
20.0~ 43 74.97 — 85.18 — 12.04 
30.0 67 72.43 88.62 1 2 . " ^ ~ . 
40.0~ 76 66.19 100.67 11.21 “ 
50.0— 92 “ 78.90 “ 103.25 “ 9.38 
60.0 97 78.58 100.24 10.04 — 
Table 3.1: Estimation of the local traffic rates in Ri to Riq. 
Router % of local Router % of local 
traffic to traffic to  
total traffic total traffic 
瓦 1 ^ I ^ e ^ 
• R2 4% R, 4% 
R3 • 30% Rs 5% 
R4 5% Rq 3% 
. -Rs 3% II Rio 38% 
Table 3.2: Percentage of local traffic to the total received traffic by V after 
60.0 seconds 
router at the end of 60 seconds, which is the time that the estimation of the 
‘ local traffic rates becomes stable. As we can observe from the table, the victim 
site V can accurately estimate the intensity of the local traffic of each router in 
the attack graph. If the victim site V wants to reduce the total traffic by 50%, 
one can set the parameter Tcutoff{V) to 50%. The victim site V can then send 
control signals to routers Rio and R3 and local traffic from these two routers 
will be eliminated according to the procedure in Figure 3.3. 
Chapter 4 
Attacker Traceback: General 
Topology 
In the previous chapter, we have presented the methodology of how one can 
deduce the local traffic rate of each router as well as the minimum stable time 
tmin such that we can determine the locations of the potential attackers in 
a linear network topology. In this chapter, we extend the methodology to 
a general attack graph topology. The basic ideas are similar to the previous 
. chapter but we need to refine our conditions under the general topology setting. 
4.1 Determination of Local Traffic Rates 
• N 
‘ Rj+1 • 
^ ― ^ in .out 
• � ( \ j ( \ j ( \ / \ > � 
- Rn — • • • 一 Rd+2 ^ ^ Rj 乐 Rj-1 — • • • • 一 Ri — / V ) 
/ \ f S 
g j � ~ 
Figure 4.1: A general attack graph Q 
30 
Chapter 4 Attacker Traceback: General Topology 31 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a general topology wherein each router may be connected 
by several upstream and downstream routers. For example, router Rj in the 
figure has three upstream routers Rj+i, Rj+2 and Rj^s and two downstream 
routers and Rk. For this attack graph, the furthest router from the victim 
site V is router Rn, which has a distance of <i > 1 hops away from V. Each 
router receives its local traffic from its network domain, some of these traffics 
are destined to the victim site V. Let Xj denotes the average local traffic rate, 
in unit of packets per second, from the router Rj to the victim site V. Let 
yp denotes the total average traffic rate from all upstream routers of Rj to 
the victim site V and A广力 denotes the total average traffic rate from router Rj 
to all its downstream routers which are targeted to the victim site V. Again, 
the goal is to deduce the local traffic rate Xj for all routers in an attack graph, 
then based on their local traffic intensities, we can identify the locations of the 
potential attackers. 
Let Q denotes the attack graph based on the attack graph construction 
method we described in Section 2. We say that a router is a leaf router in the 
attack graph Q if it is not connected to any upstream router. For example, 
in Figure 4.1, router 凡 is a leaf router. All other routers are called internal 
routers. Let (i, j ) denotes an edge between router Ri and Rj, we define A(i_^ 力 
as the average traffic rate to the victim site V that passes through the edge 
(i,j) between router Ri and Rj. 
,The average local traffic rate \j for router Rj G Q is: 
入�t if Rj is a leaf router, 
, , . (4.1) 
I Xj - Xf if Rj is an internal router. 
where Xf and are the average traffic rates into and out of router Rj 
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respectively. These average traffic rates can be computed by 
Af = E � -力’ (4.2) 
v(t j ) where Ri is an 
upstream router of Rj 
入 r = E � ‘ ) . (4-3) 
v(j’fc) where R^ is a 
downstream router of R j 
Therefore, if we can estimate the average traffic rate <X(“j_) for all marked edges 
(z, j ) in the attack graph Q, then we can deduce the average local traffic rate 
of each router based on Equations (4.1) to (4.3). In Figure 4.2, we present the ‘ 
procedure to estimate A ( “ j ) for each marked edge ( t , j ) in 口. 
Let be the random variable denoting the number of marked packets 
received by the victim site V at time t such that the start field is equal to � • 
router Rj. Let iV广⑴ be the random variable denoting the number of marked 
packets received by the victim site V at time t such that the end field is equal 
to router Rj. After a sufficient amount of time in collecting these marked 
packets, we have the following relationship: 
• Np\t) yR, e Q. (4.4) 
The above relationship holds because 
1. There is non-negative local traffic originated from router Rj to the victim 
� site V, therefore, the number of marked output packets from Rj can be 
greater than the number of marked input packets to Rj in the long run. 
2. The probabilistic edge marking algorithm will mark any transit packet 
to V from the upstream of router Rj. Therefore, the router Rj may erase 
any edge marking of a transit packet from its upstream routers. 
Chapter 4 Attacker Traceback: General Topology 33 
4.2 Determination of Minimum Stable Time 
tmin 
The remaining issue is that to have an accurate estimation of the local traffic 
rate Aj, we have to guarantee that the conditions in Equation (4.4) are satis-
fied. Once the conditions of Equation (4.4) are satisfied, we can then estimate 
local traffic rate \j based on Equation (4.1) - (4.3) to traceback the poten-
tial attackers. In the following, we provide an analytical method to derive 
the minimum stable time tmin such that the conditions of Equation (4.4) are 
satisfied. 
Algorithm: Estimating the Average Traffic Rate 
A(“j) for each edge (i,j) in Q 
Let Q be an attack graph with root V; 
Each marked edge (i,j) in Q has (Ri, Rj,d(j_^j�, N ( “ j ) ) 
/ * Ri - s tar t address of the marked edge j ) 
Rj = end address of the marked edge (z, j ) 
d ( “ j ) = hop count between Ri and v i c t im V 
. = the number of times t h i s marked edge 
.(i,j) has been c o l l e c t e d */ 
Set = 0 for all edges (i, j ) in ^ ； 
For each edge in ^ { 
" / * go through each edge in Q * / 
add A(“力 by ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
‘ } 
• output: average traffic rate A ( “ j ) for each 
edge { i j ) in Q. 
Figure 4.2: Procedure to estimate for every marked edge (ij) in Q. 
Let A^严⑴ be the number of marked packets received by the victim site 
V at time t such that the s tar t field is equal to router Rj. Let 啤、{) be the 
number of marked packets received by the victim site V at time t such that 
Chapter 4 Attacker Traceback: General Topology 34 
the end field is equal to router Rj. We have the following relationship: 
咖 = ； ^ A ( “ 身 ( 1 - p y W i � （4.5) 
N r \ t ) = Z � K l — （ 4 . 6 ) 
where A ( “ j ) � a n d � are the traffic rate estimation of the corresponding 
edge (i, j ) and (j , k) at time t according to the procedure given in Figure 4.2, 
d ( “ j � a n d are the hop count from router Ri to victim V and from router 
Rj to victim V respectively. 
To simplify notation, let us define and A'广⑴ as: 
A ' r � =E - p ” ( … ， 
A '广⑴= E � … 
V(j,A：) 
yvf � = a t � t a n d = A ' 广 ⑴ t ( 4 . 7 ) 
We can re-formulate the problem of finding the minimum stable time tmin such 
. that: 
> > Pthreshoid 肌3 ^ 口 . ( 4 . 8 ) 
where pthreshoid is a large probability (e.g., pthreshoid = 95%). The formulation 
implies to find the minimum time such that with a very high probability, the 
number of collected packets marked by the router Rj is higher than the number 
of collected packets marked by the upstream routers of Rj, for all routers in 
the attack graph Q. Assuming that the random variable is a Poisson process^ 
1 Again, in later chapter, we will illustrate that the estimate is still very robust to evaluate 
tmin even if the arrival process is non-Poisson. 
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,we have 
CO 
= > k]?V0h[N^-{trmn) = k] 
k~0 
CO 「 0 0 \ , 1 -
f - ^ n\ X 
kl 
Vi?, G G. . (4.9) • 
Again，we can easily determine the minimum stable time tmin using some 
standard numerical methods [BF88 . 
Chapter 5 
Simulations 
In this chapter, we perform simulations to illustrate the effectiveness in locating 
the attackers. In particular, we show the correctness and robustness of using 
Equation (3.6) and (4.9) to find the minimum stable time tmin such that we 
can compute the intensities of the local traffic rates for all routers in the attack 
graph Q. Note that a smaller value of tmin implies that we can find the locations 
of the attackers earlier. We illustrate various factors which can influence the 
values of the minimum stable time tmin ‘ We also extend the analysis of the 
attacker location scheme to a general network topology. In the first two sets 
of simulations, we use a linear network topology as depicted in Figure 5.1. To 
derive the attack graph, the victim V informs the participating routers to mark 
packets with probability p = 1/25. To estimate whether we have reached the 
stability conditions specified by Equation (3.6) or (4.9), we set pthreshoid = 95%. 
In other words, the estimation of the local traffic rates is highly accurate. We 
define a variable, Attack Traffic Ratio (ATR), which is the ratio of the 
attacker's average traffic rate to the normal average local traffic. For example, 
if the normal average local traffic is 100 pkts/sec and ATR is set to 20, then 
the attacker's average traffic rate is equal to 2000 pkts/sec. 
36 
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R d — R d - i 一 R d - 2 一 • • • • 一 R 3 一 R 2 — R i — / V ) 
y W Sr Sr Sr^ 
入d 入d-1 入d-2 入3 入2 乂 1 
Figure 5.1: Network topology for Simulation 1 and 2. 
5.1 Simulation 1 - Correctness and robustness 
of estimating the minimum stable time tmin 
This set of simulations evaluates the correctness of the estimation of the min-
imum stable time tmin based on the mathematical model (3.6) presented in 
Section 3.1. We show that the estimation is robust and accurate for different 
traffic arrival processes, for example, Poisson arrival process, constant arrival 
rate or burst mode and even packet generated under the Markov-Modulated 
Poisson Process (MMPP) [Nel95]. We demonstrate the performance tradeoff 
with different values of the parameter pthreshoid- For this set of simulations, we 
• maintain the normal average local traffic to 100 pkts/sec. The ATR is set to 
20 (in other words, the attacker's average traffic rate is 2000 pkts/sec). 
5.1.1 Simulation l .A - Influence on tmin by different 
� packet arrival processes 
In this simulation, we use a linear topology in Figure 5.1 with 25 routers (e.g., 
4 = 25). There is one attacker and he is located at the furthest router The 
normal traffic and the attack traffic are generated using three methods: (1) 
Poisson process, (2) constant rate (e.g., an average rate of 100 pkts/sec implies 
that every 0.01 second, there is a new packet generated by a router), (3) burst 
rate (e.g., an average rate of 100 pkts/sec implies that we generate 100 pkts 
in one burst for every second). To compute the minimum stable time 艺饥w e 
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use the mathematical derivation in Equation (3.6). Table 5.1 illustrates that 
with different values of tmin, our theoretical computed pthreshoid value is very 
close to the simulated pthreshoid values for different traffic generation processes. 
This indicates that our methodology is very accurate and robust in estimating 
the minimum stable time tmin and, regardless of the packet arrival processes, 
it takes around 25 seconds to determine the local traffic rates of all routers in 
the attack graph Q. 




Values Poisson Constant Burst 
5 . 0 ~ 79.46 — 79.37 = 79.69 79.88 
87.35 8 7 . 3 6 8 7 . 3 6 — 87.32 
91.80 9 1 . 7 4 ~ 91.78~~ 91.84 
""^OT" 94.55 9 3 . 9 3 ~ 94.48 — 94.59 
25.0 96.31 96.19 96.21 96.54 
. Table 5.1: Minimum Stable Time: Theoretical vs. Simulation Results for 
‘ different packet arrival processes 
5.1.2 Simulation l .B - Influence on tmin by different packet 
arrival processes under MMPP 
We also consider other ways to generate normal and attack traffic. In par-
ticular, we consider a two-state Markov-Modulated Poisson Process 
where X{t) € {0 ,1 } . Let A (/i) be the transition rate from state 0 (state 1) to 
state 1 (state 0). If the state of this Markov process is in state 1, then packet 
generation is enabled. If the state of the process is in state 0，then no packet 
is generated into the system. Again, the packet generation at state 1 can be 
classified into three types, namely, (1) Poisson process with an average rate of 
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100 pkts/sec, (2) constant rate (e.g., an average rate of 100 pkts/sec implies 
that every 0.01 second, there is a new packet generated by a router), (3) burst 
rate (e.g., an average rate of 100 pkts/sec implies that we generate 100 pkts 
in one burst for every second). We consider two different sets of MMPP, (a) 
A = 2.0," 二 1.0 and, (b) A = 10,// = 30. Table 5.2 and 5.3 depict the influence 
on the minimum stable time tmin under these two MMPP settings. Again, we 
observe that it is very accurate and robust in estimating the minimum sta-
ble time tmin even when the packet arrival process is non-Poisson. Another 
important observation is that we can quickly estimate tmin, in particular, we 
need around 25 seconds to reach the 95% stability condition. Therefore, this 
implies we can quickly determine the locations of the attackers. 
tmin Pthreshold (%) 
(sec) 
Theoretical M M P P Pkt Generation 
Computed A = 2, /i = 1 
Values Poisson Constant Burst 
5.0 79.46 79.70 79.70 79：^ 
. 10.0 87.35 87.90 87.90 
15.0 91.80 — 91.50 “ 92.00 ~ % W ~ 
20.0 94.55 94.40 “ 94.90 94.20 
25.0 96.31 95.50 96.20 9 6 . ^ 
Table 5.2: Minimum Stable Time: Theoretical vs. Simulation Results for 
� different packet arrival processes under MMPP with A = 2.0 and fx = 1.0 
'5.1.3 Simulation l .C - Influence on tmin and variance of 
traffic rate estimation by different pthreshoid 
Equation (3.6) indicates that if the stochastic relationship in Equation (3.1) 
are satisfied with a high probability pthreshdd, the estimation of local traffic 
will then be accurate. The accuracy can be expressed by the variance of the 
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tmin Pthreshoid (%) 
(sec) 
Theoretical M M P P Pkt Generation 
Computed A = 10, " = 30 
Values Poisson Constant Burst 
5.0— 79.46 81.50 = 77.50 = 78.30 
" l O ^ 87.35 88.00 86.80 86.20 
"T5JD~ 91.80 9 1 . 7 0 ~ 92.70 ~ ~ 90.50 
20.0— 94.55 ~ ~ 93.40 ~ 93.90 “ 94.60 
25.0 96.31 97.30 95.90 96.60 
Table 5.3: Minimum Stable Time: Theoretical vs. Simulation Results for 
different packet arrival processes under MMPP with A = 10 and /i = 30. 
local traffic rate estimation. In this simulation, we illustrate how the pa-
rameter Pthreshoid affects the minimum stable time tmin and the quality of the 
attacker's traffic rate estimation. Figure 5.2 illustrates that for different values 
of Pthreshoid, we havc different values of tmin and its associated variance of at-
tacker's traffic rate. Figure 5.2 shows that the variance in the estimation of the 
attacker's traffic rate approaches to zero (e.g., which represents a highly accu-
rate estimation of attacker's traffic) when we set Pthreshoid > 80%. Of course, 
a higher value of pthreshoid also implies a larger value of tmin, which can affect 
how quickly we can determine the locations of the attackers. Nevertheless, 
because tmin is less than 60 seconds, this implies that we can quickly response 
to the DDoS attack and locate the attackers. 
5.2 Simulation 2 - Factors which influence the 
minimum stable time tmin 
In this set of simulations, we illustrate how the length of an attack path, the 
number of attackers, and the attack traffic ratio ATR can affect the values of 
the minimum stable time tmin- For this set of simulations, we maintain the 
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Figure 5.2: Influence on tmin and variance of the attacker's traffic rate estima-
tion by different pthreshoid-
normal average local traffic to 100 pkts/sec. The ATR is set to 20 (or the 
attacker's average traffic rate is 2000 pkts/sec). 
5.2.1 Simulation 2.A - Influence on tmin by different 
, length of the attack path 
In this simulation, the relationship between the length of an attack path and 
� the minimum stable time tmin is analyzed. We use a linear network topology 
with varying length of attack path and compute the minimum stable time 
fmin. We assume there is one attacker and he is located at the furthest router 
(e.g., Rd) Figure 5.3 shows that as the length of the attack path increases, the 
minimum stable time tmin also increases. The reason for this linear growth is 
that the victim site V needs to take a longer time to collect sufficient number 
of marked packets from the furthest router. 
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Figure 5.3: Influence on tmin by different length of the attack path 
5.2.2 Simulation 2.B - Influence on tmin by the relative 
positions of the attackers 
In this simulation, we study how the number of attackers and their relative 
positions influence the value of the minimum stable time tmin. We consider 
three attackers "in a linear network topology and these three attackers are 
distributed by three different configurations. For configuration I, these three 
� attackers are located at routers R2 and R3 (e.g., the 3 closest routers to the 
victim V). For configuration II, these three attackers are located at the three 
j\irthest routers frpm the victim V. In configuration III, these three attackers 
are evenly distributed along the linear network, for example, they are located 
at routers 宁 j where d is the length of attack path and i=l,2,3. Figure 
5.4 illustrates the minimum stable time tmin when ATR= 20 and pthreshdd = 
95%. We observe that when the attackers are closer to the victim V (e.g., 
configuration I), the achieved minimum stable time tmin is lower than other 
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configurations. The minimum stable time tmin achieves highest value when 
attackers are evenly distributed in the network (e.g., configuration III). The 
reason for this ordering is that the estimation of local traffic rate at the furthest 
router takes longer time to become stable while the estimation of local traffic 
rates at the nearest router takes less time. Regardless of the distribution of 
the attackers' positions, we can determine their locations within 30 seconds, 
which shows the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. 
30 , I  
3 Attackers, Evenly Distributed, ATR = 20’ Linear Topology 
3 Attackers at Rd-2,Rd-i,Rd, ATR = 20, Linear Topology —h-
25 3 Attackers at Ri’R2’R3, ATR = 20’ Linear Topology ： i r a 
oj； ^ • _• 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Length of Attack Path (in hops) 
Figure 5.4: Influence on tmin by the relative positions of the attackers 
5.2.3 Simulation 2.C - Influence on tmin by different ATR 
and different length of the attack path 
In this simulation, we illustrate how the attack traffic ratio (ATR) and the 
length of the attack path affect the value of the minimum stable time tmin. 
We consider a linear topology and we compute the minimum stable time tmin 
with varying attack traffic ratio as well as the length of the attack path. Since 
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the previous result suggested that tmin takes on the largest value when the 
attacker is located at the furthest router, therefore, we consider the worst 
scenario that one attacker is located at the furthest router Rd (note that this 
is equivalent to the worst case analysis). Figure 5.5 illustrates the achieved 
minimum stable time tmin under different values of ATR and the length of the 
attack path. We observe that if the attack path is longer, the minimum stable 
time tmin has a larger value. On the other hand, when the attack traffic ratio 
is high (which is usually the case for a DoS attack), the minimum stable time 
tmin has a lower value. In general, the tmin is upper bounded by 30 seconds. 
Again, this shows that we can quickly discover the locations of the potential 
attackers under a DDoS attack. 
：........ 
丨 丨 _ 
Attack Traffic Ratio (ATR) 80 
100 0 
Length of Attack Path (hops) 
Figure 5.5: Influence on tmin by different ATR and different length of the 
attack path 
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Figure 5.6: General network topology with 120 routers 
5.3 Simulation 3 - Extension to General Net-
work Topology 
In the previous set of simulations, we analyze the performance of the attacker 
location scheme by assuming the topology is linear. In this set of simulations, 
we extend the performance study to the general network topology. We evaluate 
the minimum stable time tmin of the attacker location scheme based on the 
mathematical model (4.9) presented in Chapter 4. Figure 5.6 shows a general 
network topology of 120 routers. We assume the victim V is located at the 
router Rq and the attackers are randomly assigned to different locations of 
disjoint attack paths. We maintain normal average local traffic to 10 pkts/sec 
and vary the attackers' average traffic rates to 8000, 9000, and 10000 pkts/sec. 
(or ATR = 800, 900, 1000). 
5.3.1 Simulation 3.A - Influence on tmin by different 
ATR and different diameter of the network topol-
ogy 
In this simulation, we vary the diameter of the general attack graph and eval-
ua,te the average minimum stable time tmin under different attackers, traffic 
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Figure 5.7: Influence on tmin by different ATR and different diameter of the 
network topology 
rates. Figure 5.7 illustrates that as the diameter of the general attack graph 
increases, the average minimum stable time tmin also increases. The reason 
is that it takes a longer time to collect sufficient amount of marked packets 
from the furthest router. Moreover, when the attack traffic ratio (ATR) is 
high (which is"a common scenario for a denial-of-service attack), the average 
minimum stable time tmin will be smaller. This simulation shows that we 
� can determine the locations of the attackers within 14 seconds in this general 
network topology, which shows the effectiveness of our proposed methodology. 
i" » 
5.3.2 Simulation 3.B - Influence on tmin by different num-
ber of attackers 
In this simulation, we vary the number of attackers in the general attack graph 
and evaluate the average minimum stable time tmin under different attackers' 
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Figure 5.8: Influence on tmin by different number of attackers 
traffic rates. The attackers are located at the furthest routers of the attack 
graph. (It is equal to worst case study.) Figure 5.8 shows that as the number 
of attackers increases, the average minimum stable time tmin decreases. The 
reason for the decrease of tmin is that larger number of attackers, more marked 
packets will be collected , faster to satisfy the stability conditions of the local 
traffic estimation. This illustrates we can quickly determine the locations of 
the attackers under a DDoS attack. 
5.4 Simulation 4 - Extension to Internet Topol-
/ • 
ogy 
In the previous set of simulations, we evaluate the performance of our at-
tacker location scheme in a small-sized general network topology. In this set 
of simulations, we perform a more comprehensive performance study by using 
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Figure 5.9: Internet map generated by the traceroute dataset 
a large-sized Internet topology obtained from Lucent Bell Labs [tra99]. Figure 
5.9 shows an Internet mapi generated by the traceroute dataset. The testing 
dataset in our simulations contains 10,000 distinct routers and the maximum 
height (or the maximum hop count from the victim site V to the furthest router 
in the graph) is 23. The source of traceroute is considered as the victim site V 
‘ and the traceroute dataset is considered as the map of the upstream routers. 
We use this dataset and repeat similar simulations as in Simulation 3. We 
maintain normal average local traffic to 1 pkt/sec and the attackers' average 
traffic rate to 10000 pkts/sec (ATR = 10000). 
^Image from h t t p : / / r e s e a r c h . l u m e t a . c o m / c l i e s / m 3 L p ) Internet Mapping Project. 
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Figure 5.10: Influence on tmin by different diameter of the network topology 
5.4.1 Simulation 4.A - Influence on tmin by different di-
ameter of the network topology 
‘ In this simulation, we study the relationship between the diameter of the 
general attack graph Q and the average minimum stable time tmin in Internet 
topology. The main difference between a small-sized topology and a large-
sized topology is that the aggregate transit traffic for routers which are closer 
� to a victim site V is significantly larger than those routers which are further 
away from the victim site V in a large-sized topology. Figure 5.10 illustrates 
the average minimum stable time t—n when there is a single attacker. Again, 
we observe that when the attacker is closer to the victim site V, then we can 
determine the location of the attacker earlier. One important point is that 
even for this large network, it only takes less than 20 seconds to determine the 
local traffic rate of each router and locate the attacker. This implies that our 
methodology is very robust and accurate in determining the locations of the 
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Figure 5.11: Influence on tmin by different number of attackers 
attackers. 
5.4.2 Simulation 4.B - Influence on tmin by different num-
ber of attackers 
In this simulation, the relationship between the number of attackers and the 
average minimum stable time tmin in Internet topology are analyzed. We use 
the same traceroute dataset as Simulation 4.A. The attackers are randomly 
assigned to different locations of disjoint attack paths. We evaluate the average 
minimum stable time tmin for different number of attackers. In Figure 5.11, we 
‘ s e e that the average minimum stable time tmin of our attacker location scheme 
decreases when the number of attackers increases. Again, this illustrates the 
effectiveness and robustness of our traceback methodology even under a large-
scale DDoS attack. 
Chapter 6 
Experiments 
In this chapter, we perform experiments to illustrate the effectiveness in lo-
cating the attackers. In particular, we show the correctness and robustness 
of using our DDoS traceback methodology to find the minimum stable time 
tmin such that we can compute the intensities of the local traffic rates for all 
routers in the attack graph Q. Note that a smaller value of tmin implies that 
we can find the locations of the attackers earlier. We illustrate various factors 
which can influence the values of the minimum stable time tmin- To test the 
performance of the our DDoS traceback methodology in real setting, we use 
20 Linux routers to setup a DDoS attack testbed shown in Figure 6.1 and 
6.2. The Linux routers are running on a Pentium IV machines and we add 
a kernel module in the routers to support probabilistic edge marking. Since 
probabilistic edge marking requires only modifying the identification field of 
the IP header of a packet, it has essentially the same processing complexity 
as standard IP forwarding, and adds little computational overhead or trans-
mission delay at. a deployment router. The well-known attack tool TFN2K 
will be used to launch UDP flood attack, SYN flood attack, and ICMP flood 
attack. In the experiments, we use a general network topology as depicted in 
Figure 6.3. To derive the attack graph, the victim V informs the participating 
routers to mark packets with probability p = 1/10. To estimate whether we 
have reached the stability conditions specified by Equation (3.6) or (4.9), we 
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set Pthreshoid = 95%. In other words, the estimation of the local traffic rates is 
highly accurate. We define a variable, Attack Traffic Ratio (ATR), which 
is the ratio of the attacker's average traffic rate to the normal average local 
traffic. For example, if the normal average local traffic is 10 pkts/sec and ATR 
is set to 10, then the attacker's average traffic rate is equal to 100 pkts/sec. 
國 
I 
'MH'^OTv m^WI^ Wu'•nMMA'PMII 
X- • 
Figure 6.1: The front view of the DDoS attack testbed 
< 
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• 
, Figure 6.2: The back view of the DDoS attack testbed 
6.1 Experiment 1: Simple DoS Attack 
This set of experiments evaluates the correctness of the estimation of the min-
‘ i m u m stable time tmin based on the mathematical model (3.6) presented in 
Section 3.1. We show that the estimation is robust and accurate for different 
types of DDoS attacks, for example, UDP flood attack, SYN flood attack, and 
ICMP flood attack. For this set of experiments, we maintain the normal av-
erage local traffic to 10 pkts/sec. The ATR is set to 10 (in other words, the 
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Figure 6.3: General network topology with 20 routers 
attacker's average traffic rate is 100 pkts/sec). 
6.1.1 Experiment l .A - Influence on tmin by different 
types of DDoS attack 
In this experiment, we use a general network topology in Figure 6.3 with 20 
‘ routers. There is one attacker and he is located at the furthest router Riq. The 
three types of attack traffic are generated: (1) UDP flood (i.e., large number 
of UDP packets are sent to the victim), (2) SYN flood (i.e., large number 
of TCP packets with SYN-bit set are sent to the victim), (3) ICMP flood 
. (i.e., large number of ICMP packets are sent to the victim) To compute the 
minimum stable time tmin, we use the mathematical derivation in Equation 
(3.6). Table 6.1 illustrates that with different values of tmin, our theoretical 
computed pthreshoid value is very close to the experimental pthreshoid values for 
different types of DDoS attacks. This indicates that our methodology is very 
accurate and robust in estimating the minimum stable time tmin and, regardless 
of the type of DDoS attacks, it takes around 30 seconds to determine the local 
traffic rates of all routers in the attack graph Q. 
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tmin Pthreshold (%) 
(sec) 
Theoretical Experimental Values 
Computed UDP S Y N ICMP 
Values Flood Flood Flood 
76.85 76.91 “ 76.89 
~TaO~ 83.73 83^9^ 83.77 “ 83.81 
~TK0~ 88.14 88.20— 88.05 —88.41 
~ 2 0 T " 91.18 90.93 90.98 —91.24 
~25.0 93.36 93.20 93.42 93.33 
30.0 94.96 94.72 94.87 95.03 
Table 6.1: Minimum Stable Time: Theoretical vs. Experimental Results for 
different types of DDoS attack 
6.1.2 Experiment l .B - Influence on tmin by different 
length of the attack path 
In this experiment, the relationship between the length of an attack path and 
the minimum stable time tmin is analyzed. We use a general network topology 
with varying length of attack path and compute the minimum stable time 
tmin- We assume there is one attacker and he is located at the furthest router. 
Figure 6.4 shows that as the length of the attack path increases, the minimum 
stable time t^in also increases. The reason for this linear growth is that the 
victim site V needs to take a longer time to collect sufficient number of marked 
� packets from the furthest router. 
6.2 Experiment 2: Coordinated DoS Attack 
In the previous set of simulations, we analyze the performance of the attacker 
location scheme by assuming there is only one attacker. In this set of simu-
lations, we extend the performance study to the coordinated DoS attack. We 
evaluate the minimum stable time tmin of the attacker location scheme based 
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Figure 6.4: Influence on tmin by different length of the attack path 
on the mathematical model (4.9) presented in Chapter 4. For this set of ex-
periments, we maintain normal average local traffic to 10 pkts/sec and vary 
the attackers' average traffic rates to 50, 300, 400, and 500 pkts/sec. (or ATR 
= 5 , 30’ 40, 50). 
6.2.1 Experiment 2.A - Influence on tmin by the relative 
positions of the attackers 
In" this experiment, we study how the number of attackers and their relative 
positions influence the value of the minimum stable time tmin- We consider 
X * 
three attackers in a general network topology and these three attackers are 
distributed by three different configurations. For configuration I, these three 
attackers are located at routers Ri, R2 and R3 (e.g., the 3 closest routers to the 
victim V). For configuration II, these three attackers are located at the three 
furthest routers from the victim V. In configuration III, these three attackers 
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are evenly distributed along the attack path, for example, they are located 
at routers R^^^ where d is the length of attack path and 1,2,3. Figure 
6.5 illustrates the minimum stable time tmin when ATR= 5 and pthreshoid = 
95%. We observe that when the attackers are closer to the victim V (e.g., 
configuration I), the achieved minimum stable time tmin is lower than other 
configurations. The minimum stable time tmin achieves highest value when 
attackers are evenly distributed in the network (e.g., configuration III). The 
reason for this ordering is that the estimation of local traffic rate at the furthest 
router takes longer time to become stable while the estimation of local traffic • 
rates at the nearest router takes less time. Regardless of the distribution of 
the attackers' positions, we can determine their locations within 30 seconds, 
which shows the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. 
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Figure 6.5: Influence on tmin by the relative positions of the attackers 
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Figure 6.6: Influence on tmin by different number of attackers 
6.2.2 Experiment 2.B - Influence on tmin by different 
number of attackers 
‘ In this experiment, we vary the number of attackers in the attack graph and 
evaluate the average minimum stable time t—n under different attackers' traffic 
rates. The attackers are randomly assigned to different locations. Figure 6.6 
shows that as the number of attackers increases, the average minimum stable 
�+ time tmin decreases. The reason for the decrease of tmin is that larger number of 
attackers, more marked packets will be collected , faster to satisfy the stability 
conditions of the local traffic estimation. This illustrates the effectiveness and 
robustness of our traceback methodology even under a large-scale DDoS attack. 
Chapter 7 
Related Work 
One major security problem of the IP protocol is that the source address can 
be filled by any user [Bel]. There is no provision to discover the true origin of 
the packet. Various researchers have proposed different approaches to solve the 
DDoS attack problem, including ingress filtering [FS98], link testing [BCOO], 
logging [SPS+Ol], and even throttle technique [YLL02 . 
While ingress filtering can reduce the number of attack packets, the best 
way to address the distributed denial-of-service attack is to traceback the at-
tackers and stop their attacks. One of the traceback approach is called the link 
testing. Link testing, is to interactively test its upstream link starting from the 
nearest routers. This process is repeated recursively until the source of attack 
IS found. There are many ways to implement the link testing and we explain 
two of them: input debugging and controlled flooding. For input debugging, 
the victim site V develops attack signature based on the characteristics of the 
attack packets. Then victim site V requests network administrators to filter 
.at tack packets o.n some egress ports and identifies which ingress ports they 
arrived from. The procedure is repeated recursively and the origin of the at-
tack can be found. This approach is usually implemented manually and Stone 
StoOO] proposed automatic way to trace the attackers within their own net-
works. But the communication overhead for exchanging message is very high 
and operations are constrained by different network administrations. Burch 
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and Cheswick [BCOO] proposed another approach, which is called the con-
trolled flooding. Victim site V interactively floods its upstream links starting 
from the nearest routers. Then the victim site V observes the changes in the 
rate of attack packets and identifies which link the attack packets came from. 
Selective flooding is repeated to further routers until the full attack path is 
found. Controlled flooding consumes many network resource such as network 
bandwidth. If it is not handled or implemented carefully, this approach can 
be considered as another form of attack. 
Both link testing approaches require the attack remains active during trace- • 
back process. Logging is another approach to traceback even after the attack 
has completed. Partial packet information will be stored in routers for the 
traversed packets and this information provides a trail of the attack path. Full 
attack path can be reconstructed by applying some data extraction methods. 
The advantage of this approach is that it does not increase the volume of 
traffic, but it increases the storage requirement of the participating routers. 
Snoeren et al. [SPS+01] proposed efficient hash-based technique to store the 
packet digestion, and stated the storage requirement is approximately below 
one percentage of the link capacity per unit time. However, because tens of 
thousands of packets can traverse a router each second, the logging data can 
still grow quickly to an enormous size and this is especially true for a very 
high speed link. Therefore, the storage overhead of routers would still be a 
•�. problem. 
While logging requires huge amount of space in each router, Bellovin [SMB 
proposed ICMP traceback (and later extensions by Wu et al. [WZMM, MMW+01]) 
which can traceback the attackers without incurring much overhead on the 
routers. The routers probabilistically generate an authenticated copy of a 
packet, including information about the adjacent routers along the path to 
the destination. These information can be used to reconstruct the path to the 
attackers. However, ICMP traffic is different from the normal traffic and may 
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be blocked or rate limited. It also needs key distribution management to deal 
with the faking ICMP packet problem. 
Savage et al. [SWKAOO] proposed probabilistic marking for traceback with-
out generating separate ICMP packets to the victim site V. Routers mark 
packets probabilistically and store the edge information in the IP header. Each 
piece of information represents a sample edge of the attack graph. Victim site 
V collects the marked packets to reconstruct the attack graph. This approach 
does not need the coordination among the network administrators and it does 
not increase the traffic flow or the storage requirement of a router. Lee and ‘ 
Park [PLOl] analyzed this marking approach and pointed out that spoofing of 
the marking field may impede traceback by the victim site V. Attackers may 
choose the spoofed marking value, source address to hide themselves. Dean et 
al. [DFSOl] formulated the traceback problem as a polynomial reconstruction 
problem. They used algebraic coding theory to encode traceback information 
in the packet, similar to Savage's approach [SWKAOO]. It also suffers the same 
spoofing problem and may be more vulnerable without the distance field in 
the marking. Song and Perrig [SPOl] reported that if the victim site V knows 
the map of its upstream routers, it does not need the full IP address in the 
packet marking. They improved Savage's marking approach [SWKAOO] by 
hashing so as to achieve a lower false positive rate and a lower computation 
overhead. They proposed efficient authentication of packet markings to filter 
’ packets with spoofed markings from the attackers. Note that approaches by 
Savage [SWKAOO] and Song [SPOl] provide the topology of the attack graph 
, o n l y . Our apprqach can be viewed as a complementary approach to them so 
as to locate the potential attackers in the attack graph. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we consider the traceback problem during a DDoS attack. In-
stead of dealing with the issue of detecting a DDoS attack, we address how we 
can locate and eliminate potential attackers. Our approach uses the proba-
bilistic marking algorithm: a victim site V, upon discovering that it is being 
attacked, will request a set of routers to mark all packets targeted to V with 
certain probability p. Based on the collected marked packets, the victim site 
V can then construct an attack graph. We enhance the probabilistic mark-
ing algorithm by determining the local traffic rate of each router in the attack 
graph. Based on the traffic intensities, we can send signal to the corresponding 
routers, (e.g., those routers which consume highest percentages of the victim's 
resource) to eliminate their local traffics. One important technical contribution 
we made is that we provide a theoretical approach to determine the minimum 
stable time tmin, which is the minimum time it takes to accurately determine 
the local traffic rate of every participating router in the attack graph so that 
, w e can locate "the potential attackers. We carried out simulations and exper-
iments to illustrate the effectiveness and robustness of our algorithm under 
linear or general network topology. We also show the robustness of our es-
timation when the packet arrival process takes different forms, for example, 
Poisson, constant, bursty and MMPP. Experimental results show that we can 
locate the attackers within a short duration. We believe this is a valuable first 
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step towards automating a wide area network traceback facility. 
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